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APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT POINT #1 
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
CORRECTLY FOLLOWED THE COURT 
OF APPEALS REMAND BY 
CONSIDERING ATTORNEYS' FEES 
BOTH AT THE TRIAL COURT AND 
APPELLATE COURT LEVEL 
APPELLANT'S REPLY 
There is absolutely no argument that Thompson prevailed in his second 
appeal which was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals in its decision rendered on 
May 15, 2008. The breadth and scope of the remand directives as ordered by the 
Utah Court of Appeals is the central issue of this appeal. 
On remand, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically stated in appeal #2 that, 
"Because we reverse on the issue of contempt, we reverse the award of attorney 
fees and costs to Wife, which award was based on the holding of contempt. 
Likewise, there is no basis to grant Wife's request for an award of attorney fees and 
costs on appeal. Husband argues that with a reversal, he should be awarded his 
attorney fees and cost below. Utah Code section 30-3-3(2) provides that "in any 
action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division 
of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense, Utah 
Code Ann. 30-3-3 (2) (2007). Accordingly, we remand to the district court to 
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determine if an award of costs and attorney fees should be awarded to Husband 
and, if so, to determine the amount" (Record @ 555). 
Anderson argues that the specific remand from the Court of Appeals was clear 
in its directives stating that, "Husband argues that with a reversal, he should be 
awarded his attorney fees and costs below". The focus should be on the word 
below. This should be considered in stark contrast to the specific directives the Utah 
Court of Appeals set forth in Anderson I (See Addendum 4 of Appellant's Brief) 
wherein the Court gave the trial court instructions stating, "if the trial court 
determines that it can enter sufficient findings of fact to support such an award, the 
Court may also grant Wife her attorney fees on appeal" (Record @ 482). 
Anderson prevailed in appeal #1. Her attorney fees for trial and appeal #1 
were awarded and are not at issue in this appeal. Thompson prevailed in appeal #2. 
The main issue for appeal #3, this appeal, is whether the trial court committed error 
in awarding Thompson his appellate attorney fees in appeal #2. 
Thompson's assertion that the trial court correctly followed the Court of 
Appeals remand in considering attorney fees and costs both at the trial court level 
and appellate court level is incorrect. To follow remand directives from the Utah 
Court of Appeals the trial court would of necessity need to have been directed to 
examine Thompson's appellate attorney fees and costs. 
Thompson claims that the trial court correctly followed the remand directives 
of the appellate court. Thompson's claims fail if a comparison is made between the 
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directives of the Utah Court of Appeals in appeal #1, wherein the appellate court told 
the trial court that it could consider awarding Anderson her trial court and appellate 
attorney fees and the Court of Appeals directives in appeal #2, which focused on 
Thompsons request that, "he should be awarded his attorney fees and costs below." 
Anderson contends that the trial court went beyond that scope of the remand as 
directed by the appellate court. 
Thompson cites Oliekan v. Oliekan, 147 P.3d 464, 471, 562 Utah Adv. Rep. 
15 (Ut. App. 2006) as "the standard for awarding attorney fees on appeal". 
Thompson's reliance on Oliekan is misplaced however. In the remand directives 
from appeal #2, the appellate court references Thompson's request for fees below. 
Likewise, the two important operative words from the Oliekan opinion as referenced 
by Thompson are "generally" and "we". Generally does not mean always. More 
important is the word "we". This word identifies that it is within the appellate courts 
discretion to make the decision as to appellate attorney fees. Previous caselaw 
supplied by Anderson in her initial brief supports this conclusion. 
Another extremely important issue to be considered in this same vein of 
thought is whether Thompson adequately or properly put the Utah Court of Appeals 
on notice that he was seeking his appeal attorney fees when he filed appeal #2. 
Thompson claims in his argument point #1, page 11, that attorneys' fees on 
appeal were requested. Thompson refers to his statement which is the last 
sentence of his initial brief prior to the conclusion section wherein he states, 
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"Respondent is also entitled to his attorney fees and costs of appeal". Thompson's 
exhibit verifies this on page 28 (Addendum 2 of Appellants brief). 
Interestingly enough, Thompson's statement is not a request or prayer of 
relief. Simply put, Thompson CLAIMS he is entitled to his appellate attorney fees. 
Thompson's initial brief is controlling regarding what his request for relief is from the 
appellate court. He did not ask for specific relief of his appellate attorney fees. He 
told the Utah Court of Appeals in the last sentence of a 28 page initial brief that he is 
entitled to appeal attorney fees. This is a far cry from the claims that Thompson is 
now making that the Utah Court of Appeals consider awarding him appellate 
attorney fees and costs and that he had been requesting them all along. 
Thompson also claims in his Reply Brief for appeal #2 that he also requested 
appeal attorney fees (see Addendum 3 of Appellee's Brief). Once again, 
Thompson's claim is made in error. Similar to Thompson's first claim, the last four 
words of the conclusion "including fees on appeal" are part of a statement, not a 
request for relief. Therefore, Thompson's assertion must fail. Obviously, the Utah 
Court of Appeals did not interpret these statements (which seem as mere 
afterthoughts on Thompson's part) as a proper request for relief. That is why it is 
Anderson's position that the Court of Appeals specifically delineated that Thompson 
had requested that attorney fees incurred BELOW be dealt with in the remand. 
Thompson's final paragraph at point one of his argument (page 12) exposes 
the weakness of his overall proposition. His argument point #1 is that the trial court 
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followed the remand directives of the appellate court. However, in the final 
paragraph of this argument Thompson suggests that, "the remand instructions 
should be read to require a determination of the amount for attorney fees for 
Thompson at both the trial court and appellate court levels". 
If the remand directives issued by the appellate court are subject to 
interpretation and should be read a certain way, how can Thompson claim that he 
followed an ambiguous directive? Therefore, Thompson's claim is not made in good 
faith. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT POINT #2 
THE DISTRICT COURT ON REMAND 
HAD AUTHORITY TO ADDRESS THE 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS AT 
THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE 
COURT LEVEL 
APPELLANT'S REPLY 
Thompson claims that Anderson incorrectly analyzes the Utah Court of 
Appeals decisions in Slatterv v. Covey & Co. 909 P. 2d 926, 929 (Ut. App. 1995) 
hereafter referenced as Slattery II, and it companion case of Slatterv v. Covey & Co., 
857 P. 2d 243 (Ut. App. 1993) hereafter referenced as Slattery I. 
Slatterv I is exactly on point with appeal #2 in this case in that the appellate 
court declined to specifically address the issue of whether the trial court could 
consider awarding appellate attorney fees. In fact, the appellate court decision in 
Slatterv I. footnote 4, could readily apply in appeal #2 of this matter because the 
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appellate court elaborated in Slatterv I that, "Because Slattery does not present any 
argument to support her request for fees on appeal, we decline to address the 
issue". As fully set forth in the prior argument response, Thompson never in fact 
properly raised the appellate attorney fee issue in his appeal or presented any 
argument! 
Thompson also claims that Anderson's reliance on Cache County v. Beus. 
128 P. 3d 63, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. (Ut. App. 2005) hereafter, Cache County II, is in 
error based upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The issue set forth in 
Cache County II that Anderson relies on is enumerated in footnote 7, wherein the 
appellate court stated that, "the trial court had no discretion to award Cache County 
the attorney fees it incurred on appeal in Cache County I". 
In fact, the appellate court in Cache County II set forth its reliance on the 
various rulings it had entered in the Slatterv cases. 
Thompson claims in his argument at point 2 of the title section that, "The 
district court on remand had authority to address the attorney's fees and costs at the 
trial court and appellate court level". What is difficult to understand about this 
argument is that the same problem arises as in Thompson's argument point #1. 
These are mere assertions that are set forth by Thompson and there are no 
supporting claims, statements, affidavits, caselaw, or anything else to support these 
bald assertions. Thompson must prove and deliver on these assertions if there is to 
be any merit to his claims. Thompson attempts to refute the several cases cited by 
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Anderson without providing any back up to his claim that the district court "had 
authority". 
Further, even if Thompson was correct in his claims that Anderson relied in 
error on Cache County or Anderson incorrectly analyzed Slatterv, the fact remains 
that the key doctrine and principles that the appellate court set forth in the various 
Slatterv and Cache County opinions, is valid binding caselaw that has not been 
refuted by Thompson and that should be extrapolated and used as a basis for this 
appeal. 
Finally, Thompson attempts to mislead the appellate court by claiming in the 
last paragraph of his brief at page #18 that,"... the cases cited by Anderson do not 
support her position that the trial court acted in opposition to the mandate of this 
Court." This statement implies that there was a specific mandate from the appellate 
court in appeal #2 regarding Thompson's appellate attorney fees. Anderson clearly 
pointed out in page #12 of her initial brief and page #8 that there was no specific 
reversal or remand directives from the appellate court relating to the appellate 
attorney fee issue. It was possible with there being no specific directive, that silence 
on the part of the appellate court may be construed as a non-decision from the court. 
Interestingly enough, if the appellate court had not given specific remand 
directives to the trial court in appeal #1, under Thompson's current theory, Anderson 
would still be entitled to appellate attorney fees in appeal #1 even without a specific 
remand directive. 
10 
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APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT POINT #3 - MANDATE DOCTRINE 
THE MANDATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT 
APPLY TO CIRCUMSTANCES IN 
WHICH APPLICATION OF THE RULE IS 
ERRONEOUS 
APPELLANT'S REPLY 
Thompson analyzes in this section of his brief the mandate doctrine or law of 
the case doctrine even though this issue was not raised by Anderson in her initial 
brief. Thompson elaborates on why the mandate doctrine should not apply in this 
case and lists several supporting cases to prove that if the mandate doctrine is 
applied, it would be erroneous. 
What is critical to understand from point #3 of Thompson's argument is the 
evolving nature of Thompson's arguments. In argument point#1 Thompson claimed 
that the trial court "correctly followed the court of appeals remand." In argument 
point #2, Thompson claims that, "the district court had the authority to address 
attorney fees and costs at the trial court and appellate court level". Both of these 
assertions were not supported by argument or caselaw. They were very similar to 
the bald assertions made by Thompson when "claiming" that he had alerted the 
appellate court that he was seeking appellate attorney fees in appeal #2. Next, 
Thompson admits in his brief that, "the remand instructions should be read to require 
a determination of the amount for attorney fees for Thompson at both the trial court 
and appellate court level". 
l i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thompson is hinting that the remand directives need some interpretation and 
is further exposed in point #3 of Thompson's arguments when he stated that, "the 
trial court acted within the scope of the remand..." and also that the remand for 
attorney fees was entered "without limitation". 
These numerous claims and continuous requests by Thompson to view the 
remand directives in several different ways reveal the ever-changing nature of 
Thompson's argument. Thompson's final attempt to change his argument occurs 
when he describes the remand on page 20 of his brief, first full paragraph, stating 
that" the remand to the district court for consideration of attorneys fees involves at 
least a matter left open by the Court." This leads one to wonder if Thompson is 
advocating that the remand was specific or was it left open for interpretation or were 
there no limitations or was the remand within a certain scope. This analysis leaves 
one pondering if Thompson's arguments have a feel for that of a chameleon effect. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT POINT #4 HARMLESS ERROR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
AWARDING THOMPSON'S 
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
WITHOUT A SPECIFIC REMAND, THIS 
ERROR WAS A HARMLESS ERROR 
APPELLANT'S REPLY 
Thompson claims in his argument, point #4, that if the trial court erred in its 
award of appellate attorney fees to Thompson, the error was harmless. Thompson 
makes this assertion that the harmless error doctrine should be applied by the 
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appellate court in this case, yet then Thompson gives the appellate no argument or 
rationale for this statement. There is absolutely no caselaw or anything to support 
Thompson's contention that the harmless error doctrine should be applied. 
Anderson has pointed out this same problem with numerous claims of Thompson. 
The harmless error doctrine is usually applied when the litigant appeals the 
decisions of the trial court and then the appellate court must decide if the error was 
specific enough to strike down the decision of the trial court. The doctrine of 
harmless error prevents unnecessary new trials when the error would not have 
affected the outcome. 
Here, invoking the harmless error doctrine makes no sense. The issues the 
appellate court has been asked to examine are fairly narrow. 
Thompson's first two statements under this section are clearly incorrect. He 
states, "The law applicable to appellate attorney fees are not in dispute." In support, 
Thompson has asked the appellate court to consider Oliekan and now under this 
point Thompson asks the Court to consider Glew v. Ohio Savings Bank. 181 P. 3d 
791. Anderson has asked the appellate court to consider the Slatterv and Cache 
County cases supporting her position. 
Thompson also cites Oliekan and Glew to support his claims made in the 
second sentence under this argument, stating, "Thompson is entitled to fees on 
appeal if Thompson was entitled to fees at the trial court level." Once again, this is 
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an assertion made that is not supported even if the Court accepts Thompson's 
interpretation of the holdings of these cases. 
Thompson further argues in this section that Anderson's claim is simply that, 
"this Court's failure to specifically identify appeal fees and costs leads to a result that 
those fees and costs are not recoverable." This leads one to believe that Anderson's 
sole issue is that it is the appellate court's fault for failure to elaborate or specify, and 
not Thompson's fault. This is simply not true because Anderson has previously set 
forth that Thompson did not inform the appellate court that he was seeking appellate 
fee reimbursement. Surely the last twelve words stated by Thompson prior to his 
conclusion in his initial brief from appeal #2 does not qualify as a proper request for 
relief, nor does the last four words of the conclusion in Thompson's Reply Brief from 
appeal #2. This same rationale can be used to refute Thompson's claim that 
Anderson is being hyper-critical. 
Thompson seems to hang his hat on the Utah Supreme Court rulings in Glew. 
The problem with Glew is that there are facts from the Glew case that caused a 
favorable result for the party seeking appellate attorneys fees that are not present in 
Thompson. In Glew, the party requesting appellate attorney's fees had filed a 
petition for a rehearing with the Utah Supreme Court. The purpose of filing for a 
rehearing was for the sole purpose of seeking an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court treated the petition for rehearing as a motion to award 
attorney fees on appeal. 
14 
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The same cannot be said of Thompson. No petition or motion has been filed. 
Thompson did not properly seek appellate attorney fees in appeal #2 and the district 
court on remand improperly awarded Thompson his appellate attorney fees anyway. 
It is important to note that when the Utah Court of Appeals handed down its 
decision and ruling, Thompson did not distinguish between those attorney fees 
incurred as part of his order to show cause and his appellate fees. Thompson's 
attorney submitted his affidavit to the Court on January 12, 2009 claiming that 
attorney fees and costs totaled $11,365.64 through June 30, 2008 (Record @ 587-
589). Even though the Court of Appeals decision for Andersen II had been handed 
down for over one and a half months, Thompson made no attempt to distinguish 
between trial court fees and appellate fees despite the remand to have the trial court 
examine Thompson's "attorney fees and costs below". 
Thompson states that Anderson's claims are really harmless error and hyper-
critical. The reality is that huge amounts of money are on the line for Anderson even 
though the trial court awarded her approximately $50,000 for child support and 
alimony arrearages among other amounts that she should have been paid over a 
several year period of time by Thompson. This does not take into account the 
numerous contempts of court that the trial court found and the appellate court upheld 
against Thompson. 
The reversal entered by the Utah Court of Appeals in appeal #2, meant that 
the trial courts award of attorney fees in favor of Anderson in the amount of 
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$5,329.65 (Record @ 399) was reversed. The decision of the trial court in the 
remand from appeal #2 in favor of Thompson totaled $11,265.54 (Record @ 816). 
In all actuality, the decision of the appellate court in appeal #2 and the follow-up 
remand decision by the trial court took away $16,595.19 from Anderson. In the last 
evidentiary hearing held in the case by the trial court, the court found that in 
February 2009, Anderson's monthly income had been static for the past eight years 
and her gross monthly income was $728.00 (Record @ 726 and 727). The reality 
for Anderson was that this $16,595.19 swing as determined by the Court had a 
devastating effect on her. By the time appeal #3 attorney fees are calculated the 
financial considerations on these issues reach approximately $25,000.00. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT POINT #5 
APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO HIS 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
APPELLANT'S REPLY 
If the Utah Court of Appeals reverses the decision of the district court and 
does not allow Thompson his appellate fees for appeal #2, there is no justification for 
the appellate court to consider awarding Thompson his appeal attorney fees for this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's decision to award Thompson his appellate attorney fees 
should be reversed. Anderson has properly sought for an award of appellate 
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attorney fees in this appeal, appeal #3, to correct the error of the trial court in 
awarding Thompson his fees in appeal #2. Anderson seeks a reversal of the district 
court order that Thompson be awarded $7,463.01 for appellate attorneys fees 
incurred in appeal #2 and additionally seeks an order that she be awarded her 
appellate attorney fees for the costs of this appeal as she properly requested this 
relief in her initial brief. Thompson's request for appellate attorney fees for this 
appeal should be denied. 
DATED THIS / £ - day of C7%^ , 2010. 
David J Friel 
Attorney for Appellant 
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